crafted "exculpatory no" doctrine was predictable in light of the Court's increased emphasis on statutory "plain meaning." However, this Note argues that Brogan may not be a significant victory for texualists, since the Court was not asked to ignore compelling legislative history. Finally, this Note concludes that Congress is not likely to overrule Brogan by codifying the "exculpatory no" doctrine.
II. BACKGROUND A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Federal law makes it a felony to "knowingly and willfully...
[make] any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations" in "any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.0 In other words, § 1001 prohibits lying to the federal government. 8 The statute criminalizes a sweeping range of deceptive behavior, including lying on government forms as well as lying directly to federal agents. 9 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) . The full text of the statute reads:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully -(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001. (1998) .
9 Id at 93.
The phrase "knowingly and willfully" only requires that the statement or misrepresentation be deliberately made with knowledge that it is untrue.'Y It is not necessary that the speaker know that it is illegal to make the false statement." Moreover, the phrase "any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States" confers jurisdiction on all three branches of government.1 2 Therefore, jurisdiction exists as long as the matter relates to the authorized function of a govemnment entity.1
Congress enacted the statutory progenitor 4 of § 1001 in 1863 "in the wake of a spate of frauds upon the Government." 5 The original act bears little resemblance to the current statute. 6 For example, the false statement provision in the 1863 Act prohibited only those false statements that were related to the filing 'o Id. at94.
" Id at 94-95. However, under the current statute, a false statement must also be "material." Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 815-16 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see supra note 7. To be "material," a false statement "must have a natural tendency to influence or be capable of influencing a decision of the government body to which it was addressed." Combs & Thoresen, supra note 8, at 94 (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) make or cause to be made, or present or cause to be presented for payment or approval to or by any person or officer in the civil or military service of the United States, any claim upon or against the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696. The original enactment also prohibited false statements, but only those statements made "for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding in obtaining the approval or payment of [a false] claim .... Id. of fraudulent claims against the government." 7 This original provision remained "essentially unchanged for 55 years."' 18 Then, in 1918, Congress amended the statute "to cover other false statements made 'for the purpose and with the intent of cheating and swindling or defrauding the Government of the United States." ' 9 History suggests that the purpose of the 1918 amendment was to protect the new government corporations that emerged during World War 1.
2
0 Despite the amendment's somewhat broader language, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Cohn, held that the statute was still limited to "cheating the Government out of property or money., 21 The Court's interpretation of the statute in Cohn "became a serious problem with the advent of the New Deal programs in the 1930s.,, 22 The government realized that its political interests could be undercut even if it did not lose any property or money.23 For example, the government sought to limit petroleum use by restricting the amount shipped in interstate commerce. 24 However, some petroleum producers began falsely reporting the amount produced and shipped from certain oil wells.2 5 Even though the Government was not losing money as a result of the false reports, 26 the petroleum producers effectively undercut the government's interest in reducing the consumption of oil. In order to regain control, Congress responded with 17 [Vol. 89 a dramatic amendment to the statute in 1934Y It amended the statute to prohibit the making of "any false or fraudulent statements or representations... in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or of any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder .... 28 The relevant part of this statute remains substantially the same today.2
B. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Some courts found that the application of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 came "uncomfortably close" to infringing upon Fifth Amendment rights. 0 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... ."31 This clause embodies the privilege against self-incrimination. 2 The Court has held that the privilege "protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature." 3 Thus, the privilege is limited in nature because while an accused may refuse to testify at trial, he may not withhold "real or physical evidence. " 34 On the other hand, the privilege is not strictly limited to refusing to take the stand at trial. It may extend to analogous situations where the State has compelled a guilty suspect to talk 27 
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and has forced him to confess or lie.ss When an accused is effectively "boxed-in" in this way, his Fifth Amendment fights are invoked .
The Court has held that the privilege of selfincrimination is "founded on our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, lying, or punishable silence. " 38 Some courts were uncomfortable finding § 1001 liability when a suspect had faced a similar trilemma.
C. THE SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
Concerned that prosecutors would use the broad language of § 1001 to punish minor criminal activity or even lawful activity, some courts responded by adopting an exception for the 46 the Supreme Court had never examined the "exculpatory no" doctrine, even though lower courts had wrestled with the doctrine for decades. 47 In fact, the circuits divided sharply over the validity of the "exculpatory no" doctrine.
8
Seven circuits have adopted the "exculpatory no" doctrine in order to limit criminal liability under § 1001. 49 Although the circuits approached the doctrine differently, 0 each basically held "that Section 1001 is generally not applicable to false statements that are essentially exculpatory denials of criminal "The scope of the doctrine has been limited by courts in various ways, including one or more of the following: (1) The statement must be a mere denial of guilt and not an affirmative misrepresentation; (2) A truthful answer must have incriminated the declarant; (3) The declarant must be unaware that he is under investigation; (4) The nature of the government inquiry must be investigative and not administrative; (5) The false statement must not impair the basic functions of the government agency; (6) The false statement must be unrelated to a privilege or a claim against the government; (7) The false statement must be oral and unsworn; (8) The false statement must be a response to an inquiry initiated by a federal agency or department. SeeThomas, supra note 41, at § § 3-10 (1991). activity., 51 Courts adopting the "exculpatory no" doctrine were concerned with legislative intent and Fifth Amendment values. 52 First, these courts held that Congress did not intend for § 1001 to criminalize a false statement that constituted an "exculpatory no. 53 Second, these courts had a "distaste for an application of the statute that is uncomfortably close to the Fifth Amendment" privilege against self-incrimination. 54 In contrast, the Second and Fifth Circuits have expressly rejected the "exculpatory no" doctrine. 5 Both circuits argued that the plain language of § 1001 does not admit an exception for a mere denial of guilt. 5 6 Their method of statutory interpretation differed from proponents of the "exculpatory no" doctrine in that they "approached the statute by looking not at its purpose, but at its plain language." 57 Although the Fifth Circuit agreed that the purpose of § 1001 was to prohibit perversions of governmental functions, it refused to limit the statute to that purpose, "not because the rationale was an inaccurate characterization of the statute's purpose, but because such a limitation would conflict with its text." 58 The Second Circuit found that the legislative history of § 1001 was inconclusive and, therefore, had no effect on the interpretation of the statute's plain language 9 These circuits also rejected the claim that Finally, "the Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits have neither adopted nor rejected the 'exculpatory no' doctrine." While the doctrine has been raised in these circuits as a defense, the courts avoided adopting or rejecting the doctrine by holding that the exception, if there were one, would not apply to the facts of the given case.6 Therefore, none of these circuits ever reached the merits of the doctrine. 8 
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. STATEMENT On the evening of October 4, 1993, the agents surprised Brogan at his home. 7 " At that time, the agents possessed documentary evidence that Brogan had accepted several cash payments from.JRD. 74 The agents identified themselves and asked Brogan for his "cooperation in an investigation of JRD and various individuals." 75 Brogan was not advised of his right to remain silent, 76 nor was he told that it was a crime to make a false statement to a federal agent until after he responded to questioning. 77 The agents only told Brogan that he would need an attorney to cooperate in the investigation. 7 8 They told him "that if he wished to cooperate, he should have an attorney contact the U.S. Attorney's Office, and that if he could not afford an attorney, one could be appointed for him."7
At that point, the agents asked Brogan if he would be willing to answer some of their questions."' He agreed to questioning and was asked "whether he had ever received any cash or gifts fromJRD when he was a union officer," to which he simply answered "no." 8 ' One of the agents testified that they next told Brogan that they had searched JRD headquarters and had documents in their possession showing that he had, in fact, accepted cash from JRD. Then, they told him that "lying to fedments) with Petitioner's Brief at 2-3, Brogan (No. 96-1579) (accused of accepting four cash payments). Brogan and several co-defendants were tried before ajury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. ts The jury found Brogan guilty of accepting unlawful cash payments from an employer and of making a false statement to a federal agent. 87 He was fined $4000 and sentenced to nine months imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release.ts The court stayed execution of the sentence. 89 Brogan and his co-defendants appealed. 9 0 Brogan claimed that his conviction under § 1001 should be reversed because his false statement qualified as an "exculpatory no." 9 ' He pointed out that many circuits excluded an "exculpatory no" from § 1001 criminal liability. 92 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to adopt "the so-called 'exculpatory no' doctrine," 93 and consequently affinned Brogan's conviction. 4 Like the Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits, the Second had neither adopted nor rejected the "exculpatory no" doctrine. 9 5 The doctrine had been argued as a defense before the court, 0 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 808.
d& 5Id
MId. (2) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001). At trial, the payments that Brogan accepted prior to December 14, 1998, were not admissible as evidence of his accepting bribes because the statute of limitations had run. However, the payments were admitted to show that he made a false statement. Petitioner's Brief at 3, Brogan (No. 96-1579).
Petitioner's Brief at 2, Brogan (No. 96-1579). but the court "always found it inapplicable to the facts of a given case." 96 The court noted that seven courts of appeals 7 had created a 'judicially-crafted" exception to § 1001 liability for a mere denial of guilt. 9 ' It agreed that, in these circuits, Brogan's simple "no" would not be criminal.9 Nevertheless, the court refused to adopt the doctrine.' l°T he Second Circuit found no support for the "exculpatory no" doctrine in § 1001's plain language, the statute's legislative history, or the Fifth Amendment. 101 First, the court found that the statute's language was clear.
1 0 2 Then, it noted that "'as a matter of common sense and plain meaning, the word 'no' is indeed a statement." ' 1 0 3 Since § 1001's plain language was clear, the court criticized other courts of appeals for creating 'judicial gloss" on the text. 0 4 The court implied that those courts of appeals exceeded their authority because § 1001 was not ambiguous and did not yield absurd results. 0 5 Second, the Court found nothing in § 1001's legislative history to support creating an exception for an "exculpatory no." 06 The court briefly reviewed the statute's history of amendments Third, the court found that Fifth Amendment concerns about § 1001 were unfounded."' Although some courts of appeals claimed that "Fifth Amendment values" supported adopting the "exculpatory no" doctrine, it simply and firmly stated that "the Fifth Amendment has no application to circumstances in which a person lies instead of remaining silent."" ' An individual has no constitutional right to lie. 13 Therefore, the court held that the Fifth Amendment was irrelevant to the validity of the "exculpatory no" doctrine." 4 Since the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found no support for the doctrine in § 1001's literal text, its legislative history, or in the Fifth Amendment, the court refused to join the majority of circuits that had adopted the "exculpatory no" doctrine.' 5 In rejecting the doctrine, the court rejected Brogan's The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari " " on June 9, 1997 to resolve a split among the circuits regarding the validity of the "exculpatory no" doctrine.
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS

A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In an opinion written by justice Scalia," 9 the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's rejection of an "exculpatory no" exception to § 100)1 criminal liability. 20 While rejecting the "exculpatory no" doctrine, the Court noted that is was overruling the law in seven circuits.121 These circuits had ruled that a mere denial of guilt fell outside the scope of § 1001.122 However, the Court found no support for this judicially crafted exception.
The Court first looked at the relevant text of § 1001,124 which "covers 'any' false statement-that is, a false statement 'of whatever kind.""25 The word "no" by itself is a statement, albeit unelaborated, that can be contextually false. 26 Relying on a dic-"6 Id. at 36-37. 17 Id at 40. '2 Id. at 812. ' The First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits had explicitly adopted the "exculpatory no" doctrine. Id. at 808.
"'However, even among the circuits that had adopted the doctrine, there was substantial divergence concerning the content of the "exculpatory no" doctrine. Id For example, the circuits had developed different tests for whether a particular statement qualified as a mere denial of guilt. tionary definition of the word "statement," 127 the Court summarily concluded that § 1001 literally covers an "exculpatory no.' 28 Next, the Court criticized'2 proponents of the "exculpatory no" doctrine for relying too heavily on a dictum in United States v. Gilliland°3 0 In Gilliland, the Court was asked to interpret the predecessor to § 1001.1' In dicta, the Court stated that the 1934 amendment indicated "'congressional intent to protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices described"' in the statute. 32 However, the Court in Brogan explained that although it identified congressional intent in Gilliland, it did not hold that the congressional intent limited the scope of § 1001. 33 The Court was adamant that "it is not, and cannot be, our practice to restrict the unqualified language of a statute to the particular evil that Congress was trying to remedy .... "3 Therefore, the Court rejected Brogan's argument that § 1001 covers only those statements made to federal agents that pervert governmental functions. ' Even assuming that § 1001 criminalizes only those false statements that pervert governmental functions, the Court found that Brogan's "exculpatory no" perverted a proper government function.1m Brogan was under criminal investigation for accepting bribes from union officials. 39 A criminal investigation is clearly a function of the federal government. 40 Furthermore, the purpose of every investigation is to find the truth. The Court concluded that any false statement in the course of an investigation would serve to frustrate the government's purpose in uncovering the truth. [Vol. 89 defendants."" The Court concluded that "[i] n the modem age of frequently dramatized 'Miranda' warnings," it was "implausible" that a person under investigation may be unaware of this right. 9 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that there is no excuse to lie, just because silence can be used against a person. " Therefore, the Court rejected the contention that silence was not a realistic option.' 5 The Court had little tolerance for liars. It stated, "[w]hether or not the predicament of the wrongdoer run to ground tugs at the heart strings, neither the text nor the spirit of the Fifth Amendment confers a privilege to lie." 52 The Court was critical of, not sympathetic towards, the guilty suspect who must chose between admitting guilt, remaining silent, or lying. 5 ' The guilty suspect can lawfully remain silent. 54 But, his "exculpatory no" would be a lie. 55 The Court found no support in the Fifth Amendment for a privilege to lie. 56 Lastly, the Court dismissed popular concern that § 1001 will be abused by prosecutors.
The concern is that prosecutors will use § 1001 to manufacture crime or to punish a simple de- (1996) (arguing that the innocent person lacks even a "lemma")). The Court also criticized Brogan for manipulating the term in order to validate the "exculpatory no" doctrine. Id. at 810. Originally, in Murphy, the Court recognized "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt." 378 U.S. at 55. 
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SUPREME COURT REWEW nial of guilt more harshly than the underlying crime. 58 The Court indicated that no evidence was presented to show past abuse or a future threat of abuse. 9 Moreover, even if prosecutors could abuse § 1001, adopting the "exculpatory no" doctrine would not solve the problem.W The Court suggested that investigators would simply pressure the suspect into a more detailed response than the simple "no.' 6 1 Regardless, it said that "[c] ourts may not create their own limitations on legislation, no matter how alluring the policy arguments for doing so .... 62 After reviewing Gilliland, the Fifth Amendment, and policy concerns, the Court concluded that the only support for the "exculpatory no" doctrine was that seven circuits had adopted it.
63
Unlike the dissent, the Court did not place much weight on common opinion.1r4 Thus, it was not persuaded to depart from a literal reading of the text.'0 Since the plain language of § 1001 did not support the "exculpatory no" doctrine, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.6 6
B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE
In a brief concurrence, 67 Justice Souter stated that he joined the majority opinion except for its discussion of whether prosecutors could potentially abuse § 1001 as now written.'6 a On that issue, he joined Justice Ginsburg's concurrence "espousing 158 Id.
15
9 Id.
md
161 id 2 Id. at 811-12. The Court agreed with Justice Stevens' dissent that a felony conviction for a simple "no" may seem harsh. Id. at 811. However, the Court stated that it would not ignore harsh penalties unless specifically instructed to do so by the Constitution of the United States. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 3; U.S. CoNsr. amend. VIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 165 Brogan, 118 S. CL at 811. '" The Court stated that since common opinion is not consistently followed, "it becomes yet another user-friendlyjudicial rule to be invoked ad libitum." Id. congressional attention to the risks inherent in the statute's current breadth." 1 6
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE Concurring in the judgment, 70 Justice Ginsburg wrote separately "to call attention to the extraordinary authority Congress, perhaps unwittingly, has conferred on prosecutors to manufacture crimes.",7 Although she admitted that § 1001's plain language covered an "exculpatory no,' 72 she warned that federal agents could abuse the broad language.
First, Justice Ginsburg summarized the facts of both the present case 74 and United States v. Tabor.1 75 She suggested that these cases are not rare. 78 In Tabor, during the course of a criminal investigation, IRS agents discovered that a notary public had notarized a deed without having the signatory appear in front of her. 77 The notary public had violated Florida state law in doing so. 7 Knowing this, the IRS agents went to her home and questioned her about the deed. 79 The agents did not tell her that she was under investigation or that making a false statement was a felony.' s When she lied to the agents, saying that the signatory had signed the deed before her, the agents charged her with a § 1001 violation. 8 ' Justice Ginsburg commented, "an IRS the prosecutors fail to prove all the elements of a crime, a suspect should be found not guilty. However, Justice Ginsburg noted that if the prosecutors can get the suspect to lie about one fact they know to be true from the investigation, then they could bring a § 1001 charge in place of the charge they cannot prove."" Second, sometimes the statute of limitations has tolled, as it did on four out of five of the bribery charges against Brogan. 189 Justice Ginsburg suggested that investigators could get the suspect to lie about the wrongdoing in order to "revive" the charges. 9 0 In either example, the government is using § 1001 to manufacture crime. 191 Justice Ginsburg then reviewed the legislative history of § 1001 and concluded that "it is doubtful Congress intended § 1001 to cast so large a net.', 92 *The relevant part of the statute Id-(Ginsburg,J., concurring).
188
Id (Ginsburg,J., concurring). R87 Id (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 36) (emphasis added).
Justice Ginsburg uses the phrase "innocent conduct" here to refer both to blameless conduct and to blameworthy conduct that the State cannot prove.
SId. (GinsburgJ., concurring) .
... Id-(GinsburgJ., concurring).
Id (Ginsburg, J., concurring). SENTENCING GUIDENES MANUAL § 3C1.1, cmt., n.1 (1997)).
'" When charges were filed against Brogan, the Manual read: "Where the statement takes the form of an 'exculpatory no,' 18 U.S.C. § 1001 does not apply regardless who asks the question." Id at 815 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting United States Attorneys' Manual 1 9-42.160 ( Oct. 1, 1988) ).
"o While the case was pending, the Manual read: "It is the Department's policy not to charge a Section 1001 violation in situations in which a suspect, during an investigation, merely denies guilt in response to questioning by the government." Id at 815 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting United States Attorneys' Manual 1 9-42.160 (Feb.
12, 1996)).
" 'Id. (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
She counseled lower courts not to interpret the Court's opinion as encouraging § 1001 prosecutions for exculpatory nos. 0 2 Justice Ginsburg feared that the policy outlined in the United States Attorneys' Manual was an inadequate control. 2 3 She concluded her concurrence by urging Congress to limit the reach of § 1001.204 Justice Ginsburg reviewed the recommendations that were made some years ago to revise § 1001.205 She suggested that although these recommendations were never 206 adopted, the present case should revive the issue.
D. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens dissented 2 7 because he believed that the Court rashly rejected a doctrine that had wide-based support. He agreed that an "exculpatory no" would fall under the broad language of § 1001, but he argued that the Court could interpret a criminal statute more narrowly than it is written. V. ANALYSIS The Supreme Court, in Brogan v. United States, properly concluded that the plain language of § 1001 covers mere denials of guilt and is therefore inconsistent with the "exculpatory no" exception that had been adopted in seven circuits. Everyjustice conceded that the literal text of § 1001 was unambiguous. Moreover, congressional intent was unclear 22 Brogan has already been generally cited in support of relying on statutes' "plain meaning;" 224 thus, the decision has implications beyond §
1001.
A. BROGANWAS CORRECTLY DECIDED
If one accepts the "new textualist" approach,2 then the Court's holding that the "exculpatory no" doctrine cannot be reconciled with the plain language of § 1001 is straightforward and justified. The statute's language is clear: Section 1001 criminalizes "any false statement." 2 26 The grammar is not confusing and the words are not complex. Nevertheless, some scholars have found that the language is "neither plain nor simple." 227 They argue that the text contains terms that are ambiguous, such as "willfully," "false," and "statement. ' ' 2ss Some courts have, in fact, struggled with the definition of "statement," ultimately finding that a simple "no" is nonassertive and therefore not a "statement." 229 However, the Court properly rejected the argument that the language is ambiguous.230 In fact, all nine Justices agreed that the "unqualified language" of 211 § 1001 covers a statement consisting of an exculpatory no. Additionally, the Court was correct in finding that, under the facts of this case, the unambiguous statutory language trumped both congressional intent and adverse policy implica-
233
tions 2 The legislative history of § 1001 was inconclusive. Although there was evidence that Congress expanded § 1001 in 1934 in order to prohibit the "perversion of governmental functions,"2 there was no indication that Congress intended to limit the prohibition to this purpose. 3 Certainly, in 1934 Congress may never have imagined that § 1001 would be used to prosecute an "exculpatory no. " s But subsequent cases have used the statute in this manner and, despite numerous opportunities to amend § 1001, Congress has never done so. Furthermore, the Court should not be required to correct the careless drafting of Congress unless the intent of Congress is very clear. 238
2" Brogan, 118 S. Ct at 808. The Court relied on a dictionary definition of the word "statement" in concluding that the statute's language covered a simple "no" in response to a question. Id.
Id at 812 (GinsburgJ., concurring), 817 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"7 Id. at 816 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see Everhart, supra note 32, at 707-08 (arguing Congress considered but failed to pass bills that would have codified the "exculpatory no" doctrine); but see Promfret, supra note 41, at 762 (rejecting argument that Congress's failure to codify the doctrine is evidence of its rejection of the doctrine). Proponents of the "exculpatory no" doctrine argue that, in United States v. Gilliland, 2 9 the Court found that Congress amended § 1001 in order to protect the government from perversion of its legitimate functions.240 Their argument is unconvincing because, as the Court pointed out in Brogan, the statement in Gilliland is merely a dictum. 241 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg conceded in her concurrence that even if history suggests Congress amended § 1001 with a specific purpose in mind, nothing shows that it meant to limit the statute to this pur-242 pose.
However, Justice Ginsburg properly alerted Congress to the discrepancy between the original purpose of § 1001 and the current use of the statute to punish the mere denial of guilt in
.
• 243 the course of informal investigations. She found it "doubtful that Congress intended § 1001 to cast so large a net," 2 4 but nevertheless agreed that the Court should not adopt the "exculpatory no" exception in the face of unambiguous text.
24 5 In his dissent, Justice Stevens disagreed, arguing essentially for judicial activism.
2 4 He stated that it was clear "Congress did not intend to make every 'exculpatory no' a felony" and that the Court should not use the literal text as an excuse for leaving the merits of the "exculpatory no" doctrine to Congress. 24 7
Without reaching the issue of whether the Court should intrude on legislative matters, Justice Stevens' argument fails because congressional intent simply was not as clear as he stated. 248 If the Court does go beyond the literal text, it must at least have a solid basis for doing so. 24 Justices Ginsburg and Stevens had no evidence that Congress intended to limit that scope of § 1001 liability. And, even if Congress did have that intent, Congress may have chosen to rely on the discretion of a prosecutor to limit the potential reach of the statute.2so In that case, it would be improper for the Court to "re-write a statute simply because [it] is discomforted by the manner in which Congress chose to structure its enforcement...."251
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg presented no evidence that prosecutors have abused § 1001 in circuits where the "exculpatory no" doctrine has been rejected. 2 She argued that prosecutors would abuse the unrestricted language of § 1001 to manufacture crime or severely punish minor misconduct.s However, the Court did not find this argument convincing, because no evidence showed "any history of prosecutorial excess, either before or after widespread judicial acceptance of the 'exculpatory no.' "4 In any case, the Court stated that, "Courts may not create their own limitations on legislation, no matter how alluring the policy argument for doing so. They argue that prosecutors are not required to get approval from the DOJ before pressing charges so nothing prevents them from prosecuting exculpatory nos. 6 Furthermore, in addition to stating the DOJ's policy, the United States Attorneys' Manual states that the policy will be "rarely used" and "narrowly con- Second, the Fifth Amendment confers a privilege to remain silent. 2 6 The Court stressed that Brogan had the right to say nothing at all and rejected the argument that remaining silent was not a practical option. 67 The Court found that it was "implausible" that a person could be unaware of his right to remain silent in "the modem age of frequently dramatized 'Miranda' warnings. "2 ss But, Miranda warnings are not often dramatized in relation to informal investigations, such as unannounced visits to private homes, because these investigations do not require Miranda warnings.
6
Thus, it is plausible that a person could be unaware of his right to remain silent, especially during informal investigations. 270 Even if a person knows that he can remain silent, he may not invoke the privilege because he is not aware that speaking falsely to an investigator is a serious crime.
2 7 ' The casual nature of the questioning may "'not sufficiently alert the person interviewed to the danger that false statements may lead to a felony conviction."'7 2 Third, the Eight Amendment prohibits "extreme punishment for minor misconduct." 273 In Coker v. Georgia,2 4 the Supreme Court held that "the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment bars not only punishments that are barbaric, but also those that are excessive or are grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime."27 5 Therefore, in theory, Eight Amendment rights could be invoked if a suspect is convicted of a § 1001 felony for falsely denying very minor misconduct.
However, the Court in Brogan never addressed the Eighth Amendment, suggesting that in practice courts do not view § 1001 convictions as "cruel and unusual punishment." After all, Congress made it a separate crime to make a false state-" Interrogations do not require Miranda warnings unless the witness is in custody or the functional equivalent of custody. Everhart, supra note 32, at 698-99.
' Id. at 698 n.118 ("Without formal cues, the interrogee seems unlikely to be thinking in the language of rights. 287 Textualists believe that statutory interpretation should not be based on congressional intent, but rather should be based on the statute's "plain meaning," as determined by an ordinary reader of the statute." They generally claim "that a statute's text alone provides the best evidence for interpretation., 2 8 "New Textualists" like Justice Scalia are careful to review the entire statute, taking into account the canons of statutory construction and the statute's overall structure and similarity to other legislation from the same time period.20
Although Justice Scalia has "not yet revolutionized the Court's approach" to statutory interpretation, his influence is nevertheless felt on the Court. 29 ' During the last decade there has been a noticeable "'new textualist' movement on the Court. ' , dissenting) ).
See Eskridge, supra note 287, at 621 (describing the "new textualist" movement on the Court).
mid.
"'Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 808. Justice Stevens is the most prominent nontextualist, while Chief Justice Rehnquist and to a lesser extent all otherJustices besides Justices Scalia and Thomas have also favored nontextualist views. See Merrill, supra note 292, at 364-65.
Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 812 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (agreeing that the unrestricted statutory language admitted no exception for "exculpatory no"), 817 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (same).
" Eskridge, supra note 287, at 656. sion in Brogan reflects this trend, since the Court deemphasized the legislative history of § 1001 because its plain meaning was clear. The majority opinion did not examine the history of § 1001 amendments and recodifications. 309 In fact, the legislative history was not a decisive factor in Brogan. 310 The decision in Brogan may be evidence thatJustice Scalia's views are gaining support on the Court. After all, Justice Scalia authored the opinion of the Court, s1 which unabashedly supported reliance on the statute's "plain meaning." 3 12 However, Brogan was an easy case factually. The contested language in § 1001, "any false statement," was very clear 313 and the legislative history was not compelling. Although some lower courts found that Congress intended § 1001 to prohibit the perversion of governmental functions, s 1 4 the statute's history of amendments showed, if anything, intent to broaden the scope of the statute. 15 Whether Congress intended to limit the scope of § 1001 In 1996, Congress amended § 1001 to reach "the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States. 327 Several differences in the Hubbard and Brogan decisions suggest that Congress will not change § 1001 after Brogan. First, Hubbard overruled forty years of Supreme Court precedent, while Brogan rejected a doctrine that was not even uniformly recognized in the circuits that had adopted it. 28 Second, Hubbard imposed a limitation on the scope of § 1001, whereas the holding in Brogan rejected a limitation.?2 Third, unlike Hubbard, extrinsic controls were in place to limit the potential for abuse under Brogan's interpretation of § 1001.30 Although the adequacy of these controls has been justly challenged, they do exist. 5 ' The Department of Justice has an established policy against prosecuting "exculpatory nos" under § 1001 and the Fifth Amendment confers a right to remain silent during investigations. 5 2 Therefore, Congress is not likely to codify a narrow exception for an "exculpatory no," unless perhaps, after further investigation, it finds evidence of actual abuse.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court in Brogan v. United States properly concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 does not admit an exception for a false statement that constitutes a mere denial of guilt. 53 The Court acted consistently with its recent emphasis on statutory "plain meaning" by refusing to create a narrow exception in otherwise unrestricted text. 34 Although Congress may never have intended to criminalize a mere denial of guilt, it did draft a broad statute. Congress may elect to revise the statute in light of the holding in Brogan,sss but
3"
Compare Dominguez, supra note 320, at 526 (discussion of Hubbard strong precedent) with supra Part Il.C. (discussion of Brogan weak precedent). "' 118 S. Ct. 805, 812 (1998) .
See Harrell, supra note 238, at 128-29.
Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 816 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that after the decision in Brogan, "Congress may advert to the 'exculpatory no' doctrine.").
it likely will not respond unless, after initiating a thorough investigation, it finds evidence of actual prosecutorial abuse.
Although the Court rejected the "exculpatory no" doctrine because the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 did not admit it, Brogan should not be cited as a full endorsement of textualism.
The Court was not forced to chose between "plain meaning" and compelling legislative history. If congressional intent had been clearer, Brogan may have been decided differently, notwithstanding the statute's "plain meaning."
Lauren C. Hennessey
See Eskridge, supra note 287, at 621 (defining "new textualism").
